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Abstract Rural Africa lags behind global progress to provide safe drinking water to everyone. Decades of 
effort and billions of dollars of investment have yielded modest gains, with high but avoidable health and 
economic costs borne by over 300m people lacking basic water access. We explore why rural water is different 
for communities, schools, and healthcare facilities across characteristics of scale, institutions, demand, and 
finance. The findings conclude with policy recommendations to (i) network rural services at scale, (ii) unlock 
rural payments by creating value, and (iii) design and test performance-based funding models at national and 
regional scales, with an ambition to eliminate the need for future, sustainable development goals.
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I. Introduction
The economics of providing drinking water appear simple and compelling. Drinking 
water is a human necessity with a daily demand and no real substitutes, with the scale 
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of service delivery lending itself  to a natural monopoly, which should lead to financial 
sustainability. Yet, appearances are often deceptive. Globally, 2.1 billion people lack 
‘safely managed’ drinking water, including 785m people without ‘basic’ drinking water 
services, of whom four out of five live in rural areas (UNICEF/WHO, 2019). Though 
the majority of the rural water-insecure live in Africa and Asia, there are also small and 
enduring geographies of exclusion elsewhere in the world, including Australia, Europe, 
and North America, disproportionately affecting indigenous people and ethnic groups 
(Sadler and Highsmith, 2016; Filčák et al., 2017).
Policy instruments for universal drinking water are well established but difficult to 
execute. The Sustainable Development WHO devote one of their 17 targets to uni-
versal and safe drinking water for everyone by 2030. This is a daunting challenge given 
only one in five countries below 95 per cent coverage in 2015 is on track to meet basic 
drinking water services by 2030 (UNICEF/WHO, 2017). Basic drinking water services 
are specified as improved sources within 30 minutes of the household and secondary 
to ‘safely managed’ drinking water services, which are on-site, on-demand, and free of 
contamination (ibid). The latter reflect the piped water standards in most industrialized 
countries and conditions where there are economies of scale, effective regulation, popu-
lation density, and affordable tariffs. In rural Africa, rarely do these conditions hold.
The estimated, annual capital costs of delivering safely-managed drinking water in 
rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2030 is estimated at over US$5 billion per year, 
higher than costs for urban delivery in any other global region, including industrialized 
regions (Hutton and Varughese, 2016, p. 14). As a proportion of gross regional product, 
the cost of basic water services in Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to be more than 
three times higher than any other region (ibid). This gloomy arithmetic compounds the 
region’s pedestrian progress compared to the rest of the world, with over 336m rural 
people living without basic drinking water in 2017 (UNICEF/WHO, 2019).
The ambition of the Sustainable Development Goal includes schools, hospitals, 
and healthcare facilities, which are not covered in estimated global costs of delivery 
(Hutton and Varughese, 2016). The first global assessment of water supply coverage 
in facilities estimates 29 per cent of rural health facilities without water services in 
2016 (WHO/UNICEF, 2019) and 42 per cent of rural schools without water services 
(UNICEF/WHO, 2018). What these figures point to is the greater scale and scope of 
the Sustainable Development Goal challenge in addition to the well-established moni-
toring of ‘household’ access to drinking water. Unsatisfactory progress in supplying 
drinking water to rural African communities over decades, with a new focus on water 
for rural facilities, presents an unprecedented scale and scope of the challenge where re-
thinking the economics of rural water in Africa may contribute to improving economic 
design of policy interventions. We explore why rural water is different, identifying char-
acteristics of scale, demand, institutions, and finance..
II. Why are the economics of rural water different?
Any articulation of rural water policy must take into account that the economic chal-
lenge differs from urban water supply in terms of scale, demand, institutions, and fi-
nance. First, the scale at which rural water delivery has been executed has largely been 
that of the community level, with a few hundred people served by one waterpoint, in 
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contrast to the network of urban piped systems serving many thousands of people. In 
effect, rural water policy transfers operational, institutional, and financial risks to indi-
vidual communities (Hope and Rouse, 2013). Pooling these risks is increasingly feasible 
with institutions and service providers, which bundle multiple waterpoints supported 
by information from the rapid advance of automated monitoring systems using in situ 
sensors (Thomson et al., 2012a; McNicholl et al., 2019; van der Wilk, 2019).
Scale is both a physical and institutional phenomenon. A piped network is as much 
an institutional construct as a physical artefact. The formal and informal rules which 
are devised to contract, license, price, and regulate the delivery of drinking water to an 
urban population can be applied in a rural context. What differs is the degree of insti-
tutional coordination across the delivery network. For example, multiple rural settle-
ments can form a network of supply nodes managed and regulated by a rural service 
provider (or utility) under public, private, or hybrid ownership and management ar-
rangements. The institutional design of the information and monitoring systems will 
differ from a singular piped network, but the architecture of designing rules, contracts, 
and agreements is fundamentally the same.
Second, rural water demand fluctuates as households choose between multiple, off-site 
waterpoints of differing quality from rainwater harvesting, dug wells, handpumps, ponds, 
kiosks with public taps, vended water, or private tap connections. The notion of a singular 
water supply as monitored through national representative surveys used for global moni-
toring simplifies the complex choices people make on a daily basis (Figure 1). Individual 
Figure 1: The fallacy of a singular, rural drinking water source—daily water sources chosen by house-
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choices are shaped by dynamic interactions between water cost, price, and value. Rainfall 
variation, groundwater quality, and other environmental factors influence demand by 
season and location. In particular, productive use of domestic water supplies is common, 
with high demand for watering livestock in times of drought (Elliott et al., 2019). Third, 
institutions for rural water rarely allocate or manage risks and responsibilities effectively. 
Fragmented waterpoints are not networked in a coherent architecture of planning, man-
agement, and monitoring. Institutional accountability is often low, service delivery is 
unquantified and largely unknown, and infrastructure fails regularly and is fixed slowly 
(Foster et al., 2019; McNicholl et al., 2019).
Finally, finance and funding to meet the ambition of the Sustainable Development 
Goals requires new ideas on how sector funds from government, donors, and users are 
generated and allocated to create and sustain verifiable outcomes. With one in four 
rural waterpoints broken at any one time and two in three rural people not paying for 
water, the investment case relies more on the moral imperative rather than economic 
logic (Mattes et al., 2008; Foster et al., 2019). With reducing information asymmetries 
made possible through technology, performance-based models are becoming a pos-
sibility and institutional accountability more tangible (Thomson and Koehler, 2016; 
McNicholl et  al., 2019). Institutions and information which reveal and improve co-
ordination problems reduce the separation between government, the private sector, and 
water users, which is a key aspect of rethinking rural water policy (Koehler et al., 2018).
III. Policy positions and economic challenges
(i) Defining policy positions
The case for universal and safe drinking water services as a non-discriminatory, public 
service is founded on cumulative evidence of economic, political, and health benefits 
for society (Langford and Russell, 2017).
The hazard and costs of unsafe water on life and productivity demonstrate the crit-
ical role water plays in all societies which seek to flourish. Ensuring safe and adequate 
water was an existential priority in Mayan, Persian, Mughal, and Roman societies, 
which spurred innovations in the institutions and infrastructure, and inspired the mu-
nicipal, public piped systems that largely remain with us today (Scarborough, 2017). 
The failure to deliver safe water creates significant health costs for the rich and poor 
alike. As a consequence, public finances have been marshalled in major infrastructure 
investments over the last 150 years, of which some of the earliest remarkably remain 
functioning, though creaking and leaking, in many cities today.
Given the public benefits, but the uncertain private incentives to invest, an ideal 
public policy would aim to ensure no one is excluded, and drinking water use by one 
person does not diminish use by another. For example, Kremer et al. (2011) make the 
case for infrastructure investments in natural springs in rural Kenya, which are esti-
mated to reduce faecal contamination by up to 66 per cent, with child mortality falling 
by one-quarter. This reflects drinking water as a merit good, justifying public provision 
where individual choices may lead to underconsumption with social costs from public 
health costs in addition to the private burden.
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Progress to achieve this public policy goal has been slow and uneven. The world met 
the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 3 years early, with 89 per cent of people with 
‘improved’ access in 2012, increasing from 84 per cent in 2000. Inevitably, this separated 
the industrialized world from developing regions, and urban from rural (UNICEF/
WHO, 2017). For example, in 2015, the base year for the Sustainable Development 
Goals, the North America and European region remained at a constant 99 per cent 
coverage of improved access compared to Sub-Saharan African, which increased from 
45 to 58 per cent. In terms of piped water supplies, North America and Europe had 
94 per cent coverage in 2015 (89 per cent in rural, 98 per cent in urban) compared to 
24 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa (17 per cent in rural, 56 per cent in urban). Behind 
the avalanche of metrics and targets are the enduring inequalities and policy puzzles 
of how to improve and sustain universal and safe drinking to leave no one behind. The 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) take up the challenge of the narrower MDG 
focus on developing regions and proportional reduction in inequalities to a universal 
SDG creed of universality and non-discrimination.
Public policy has been influenced by the ideology of  drinking water as an economic 
good and water as a human right, with tensions between individual rights and con-
sumer choices (Seymour and Pincus, 2008) and increasingly the metaphysical and cul-
tural nature of  water (Strang, 2004; Zenner, 2019). The Dublin Statement on Water 
and Sustainable Development (United Nations, 1992) identified managing water as 
an economic good as one of  four guiding principles as part of  inter-governmental 
preparations for the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro later that year. The explicit recognition of  the value of  water and manag-
ing water as an economic good with affordable pricing made reference to drinking 
water as a basic right. However, the narrative positioned economic considerations 
ahead of  legal rights, consistent with the prevailing policy and practice of  demand 
management and the faith that market forces and consumer choices could allocate 
scarce resources efficiently. Such an outcome-orientated approach is consistent with 
the instrumental nature of  economic thinking and evaluating social choices by re-
sults. In the historical context, this was also in a time of  significant political upheaval 
in Africa and Asia, where national governments were often inheriting limited public 
services geared to serve a minority, colonial elite which lived predominantly in urban 
settlements.
A decade later the United Nations Committee on Economic, Cultural and Social 
Rights adopted General Comment No. 15, which explicitly recognized an international 
human right to water and sanitation. Departing from a consumer-choice approach, 
the general comment treated drinking water as a social and cultural good with non-
discriminatory access and affirmed the rights of individuals and groups, particularly 
women, to participate in decision-making. In 2010, the United Nations’ General 
Assembly, through resolution 64/292, recognized the human right to water and sani-
tation, and acknowledged that clean drinking water and sanitation are integral to the 
realization of all rights (UNGA, 2010). The right to drinking water is achieved by non-
discriminatory access to sufficient, safe, physically accessible, and affordable services. In 
2015, the SDGs devoted one of their 17 targets (SDG6.1) to universal and safe drinking 
water for everyone by 2030. This global political commitment acknowledges the sub-
stance of the human right without the legal obligation.
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The political resolution of the human right to water and sanitation had the support 
of 122 countries with 41 countries abstaining. A number of the largest and longest fi-
nancial supporters of development assistance to water abstained in the vote, including 
Canada, Denmark, Japan, Sweden, UK, and USA (UNGA, 2010), mainly for proced-
ural rather than substantive reasons. The resolution has no binding legal force which 
raises the question on the degree to which the type of social or economic exclusions 
are most suited to a legal right. For example, it has been argued that: ‘the exercise of 
freedom and protection of rights is proportional to the strength and institutional or-
ganization of civil society’ (Osiatyński, 2009, p. 71). In the context of ‘fragile states’ 
where government may be an impediment to more accountable and legitimate provision 
of basic services, the role of civil society may be as—or more—important in service 
delivery, particularly for marginalized and vulnerable groups. This is acknowledged by 
advocates of the human right to water who recognize ‘a human rights’ perspective is not 
a solution by itself ’ (Langford and Russell, 2017, p. xvi).
(ii) The economics of rural water
Rural waterpoints provide services to communities, schools, clinics, hospitals, and other 
facilities. The SDGs set targets and metrics to monitor rural drinking water progress 
primarily under SDG6 (drinking water) and SDG4 (learning environments). Progress 
is being made to harmonize data and reporting, but structural and procedural issues 
emerge from the national level in policy, planning, finance, and management, which 
provide some indications as to why rural water has not been historically considered as 
a networked system of rural waterpoints. The political economy of this situation lends 
itself  to valuing what we measure rather than measuring what we value, belying people’s 
daily drinking water choices. People drink water at home, in markets, at school, or at a 
health clinic. For a child with safe water at home but no water at school, current moni-
toring may tell us the letter of global progress but not the spirit of global ambition. 
Here, we focus on the economics of community water supply but return to the facilities 
issue, which is a critical dimension of how we may rethink rural water policy.
Rural water supply in Africa is commonly characterized and documented by com-
munity management of a shared, off-site water supply system used by a few hundred 
people for domestic, and often productive, purposes with limited to no regulatory over-
sight. This simple caricature disguises a number of economic and policy issues that 
guide progress towards improving services and reducing inequalities. Matters are com-
plicated by demographic, climatic, economic, and political considerations, all of which 
also have an influence on rural water demand.
Scale and population density are necessary conditions for urban piped schemes where 
high-quality services can be delivered to the homes of many thousands of people. The 
economic logic of one supplier to avoid duplicating costs (storage, treatment, delivery, 
waste, billing, customer services) makes it a natural monopoly, which can reduce costs 
and raise standards for consumers, if  properly regulated. Rural water at the community 
level lacks scale and provides a lower-quality service due to the physical time and effort 
required to collect water from off-site supplies, such as handpumps or kiosks.
A logical aspiration may be to service rural areas with piped water. History gives a 
note of caution concerning the prospects of piped water as a response for rural areas. In 
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the 15 years to 2015, piped coverage in rural Africa increased 4 percentage points to 17 
per cent. In comparison, the Central and Southern Asian region increased rural piped 
coverage by 1 percentage point to 29 per cent. In the same period, piped water coverage 
in urban Africa fell 11 percentage points to 56 per cent. The Central and South Asia 
region also had a reduction in urban piped water coverage by 5 percentage points to 
67 per cent (UNICEF/WHO, 2017, p. 105). Hard-fought gains were ephemeral and the 
prospect of universal piped water coverage, particularly in rural areas, has an uncertain 
foundation if  history is any guide to the SDG future. Plotting urban versus rural piped 
water for Africa and Asian countries, there is a tendency for rural piped provision to 
lag behind urban access (Figure 2). While a static illustration, it suggests individual 
waterpoints will remain a major component of rural water infrastructure during the 
SDG period, with the most remote and often vulnerable populations dependent on 
their performance.
The difference in capital costs between piped water systems and individual water-
points varies substantially. Where reliable surface water is available with storage and 
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gravity flow, the relative costs of piped water are greatly reduced compared to pumping 
groundwater. The energy costs of pumping using diesel or grid electricity are major 
variable costs. Again, they will vary by depth and type of system which is shaped by 
local hydrogeological systems with low pH or saline groundwater requiring stainless 
steel pipes to avoid corrosion. The rapid advance of solar pumping has created an op-
portunity to reduce some, but not all, of these energy costs. In the lowlands of Ethiopia, 
boreholes can be drilled to 1 kilometre or more to reach groundwater with costs propor-
tional to depth. In contrast, handpump-equipped boreholes are often drilled between 
20 and 70 metres with a region of US$10,000 per installation. Water testing and appro-
priate treatment is required in most national policies but not monitored or regulated 
effectively. These costs are minor compared to installation and operations, but critical 
in contexts with harmful chemicals such as fluoride or arsenic, or where salinity limits 
user acceptability and payment.
Often piped water tariffs are lower than those of  handpumps. However, aver-
ages are misleading as the seasonal spike from droughts can escalate water prices to 
over US$20 per m3 for weeks, making it more expensive than piped water in Tokyo, 
New York, or London. More commonly the figure of  US$1 per m3 is considered a 
break-even baseline for piped water schemes in urban Africa (Banerjee and Morella, 
2011). This figure broadly aligns to the rural price for water from piped schemes or 
handpumps. However, demand is not constant and often piped schemes and kiosks 
are not operated in wetter periods to reduce labour costs. This muted and seasonal 
demand—and payment—for rural piped water has made the economics of  piped pro-
vision difficult without an exclusive service area and sufficient demand, or an agreed 
subsidy. It is not uncommon in urban and rural contexts for energy costs to be sub-
sidized by government for political purposes, masking the true cost of  delivery. The 
well-rehearsed case of  South Africa providing a free ‘human reserve’ of  6m3 per 
household per month after the end of  apartheid promised social reform guided by 
political rather than economic logic, and this has been reproduced in the political cal-
culus of  elections in other countries (Koehler, 2018). Water has, and will likely always 
remain, a political as well as an economic good with bleak prospects for any policy 
which does not recognize this.
The economics of pricing rural water is inevitably political, but has often lacked 
sufficient attention to the characteristics of varying user demand, despite early evi-
dence of the challenge (World Bank, 1993). Seasonality of demand has also been rec-
ognized but not adequately addressed in water pricing and infrastructure choices. There 
is increasing empirical evidence that users largely use waterpoints in the dry season and 
their local payments are biased to this period. There are common rural payment ap-
proaches including pay-as-you-fetch, pay-when-breaks, monthly fee, or no payment. In 
the coastal Kenyan context, roughly half  of households pay a monthly fee, a third do 
not pay, a quarter pay-as-you-fetch, and the remainder pay-when-breaks. The pay-as-
you-fetch model generates more revenue, leads to more expenditure, and has an overall 
higher net income than the alternatives, and critically leads to 10–20 fewer downtime 
days per breakdown (Foster and Hope, 2017).
The productive use and payment relationship suggests a ‘water-pays-for-water’ hy-
pothesis. The idea is that water used for economic activities, such as watering livestock 
or small-scale irrigation, would generate income to be available to pay for the water ser-
vices. Households who reported using waterpoints for small-scale irrigation or watering 
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livestock have revealed more regular payment behaviours in Kenya (Foster and Hope, 
2016). The sometimes narrow conceptualization of waterpoints as sources of domestic 
water ignores this key characteristic of water demand, particularly in semi-arid or arid 
landscapes where pastoralism is a major livelihood activity. Recent advances in auto-
mated monitoring of rural waterpoints reveals major increases in usage patterns in 
drier spells and drought conditions when alternative supplies are no longer available 
(Nagel et al., 2015; Thomson et al., 2019). Another positive predictor of payments is 
waterpoint proximity which relates to demand and avoidance of the considerable time 
costs of walking to and queuing for water, largely by women and girls. The criterion for 
‘basic water’ is collection should be no more than 30 minutes for a round trip to reflect 
not only the distance but the time costs, particularly in times of scarcity and increased 
demand on limited infrastructure.
Affordability is a key determinant of pricing which remains a concept in search of 
consensus (Hutton and Andres, 2018). Setting a price which secures an acceptable water 
service at a reasonable price and does not prejudice consumption of other basic services 
is not simple. With an estimated two out of three rural water-users in 19 African coun-
tries not paying for water (Mattes et al., 2008), there is compelling evidence that infra-
structure supply weakly aligns to consumer demand. One bench-mark of an affordable 
price has been estimated to be 3–5 per cent of total household expenditure (UNICEF/
WHO, 2017). However, this benchmark only has value if  you have relevant data for 
monitoring and regulation.
Regulating affordability is well-established in industrialized countries but almost en-
tirely absent in rural Africa. Setting an affordable tariff  is a balancing act between 
legal obligation, policy coherence, political expediency, economic efficiency, and social 
inclusivity. These forces rarely push in the same direction all of the time. Economic 
regulation of drinking water services must be an independent and enforceable institu-
tional function to be able to hold government to account. Where regulation is absent 
or merged into policy or service delivery functions it creates a conflict of interest: the 
incentive to mark your own homework favourably is strong.
(iii) Institutional design and performance
Institutional design is central to the economic performance and social outcomes of 
rural water services. Institutional design affects the management of operational risks 
and information flows, asset ownership and management, service delivery models, 
monitoring and regulation, and financial sustainability. The contextual nature of these 
issues is influenced by climatic, environmental, and cultural factors.
Water security is an outcome measure of the interactions and trade-offs between 
water services and water resource systems (Grey and Sadoff, 2007). It will vary by social 
and environmental context with recognition of how climatic and hydrological condi-
tions influence and shape water service delivery. Managing competing demands from 
agriculture and industry are also relevant for sustainably delivering services over time 
(Ferrer et al., 2019). The SDGs consist of distinct targets: safe and affordable drinking 
water for all (SDG6.1); improving water quality (SDG6.3); increasing water use effi-
ciency and reducing water scarcity (SDG6.4); and protect and restore water ecosystems 
(SDG6.5). The complex interaction between these targets and the means of reaching 
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them make it inevitable that some actions towards achieving one target may diminish 
progress on others.
Institutions can promote solutions to such coordination problems. However, this is 
a non-trivial challenge which promotes the idea of a locally appropriate and politically 
acceptable water security outcome. In rural contexts, water access, pollution, scarcity, 
or competition will vary in significance and salience promoting a locally defined, water 
security outcome. Institutions offer the formal and informal rules to identify, collect, 
and share information, create incentives, and sanction behaviour. This may be strength-
ened through existing social and cultural norms, codified by law and contracts, and 
scaled through adapting and adopting best practice.
Community management has been the primary institutional model for rural water in 
Africa since the 1980s (Arlosoroff et al, 1987). The burden of risk is located locally and 
is independent of other similar waterpoints, effectively putting all the risk on to indi-
vidual communities, often those least equipped to manage that risk. Many waterpoint 
risks are often idiosyncratic, so insurance logic suggests pooling these idiosyncratic 
risks to reduce them, although this will not reduce systemic or chronic risks, such as 
drought, or saline intrusion into coastal groundwaters. Economies of scale would also 
suggest that pooling waterpoints and managing them collectively rather than individu-
ally is likely to be more efficient and effective. Economies of scale would accrue from 
allocating responsibilities, and specialization in professional maintenance and manage-
ment which would reduce the local costs subject to the scale of operations and infor-
mation asymmetry. Emerging evidence suggests performance can be improved through 
such a model, reducing breakdown times from a month or more to less than 3 days 
(McNicholl et al., 2019).
Improving the allocation of institutional, operational, and financial risks depends 
on reducing information asymmetry and understanding the political economy of the 
sector. Information asymmetry may influence institutional design due to the tyranny 
of distance (Blainey, 1966). When first conceived, community management was a prin-
cipled and pragmatic response given few alternatives in rural Africa in the 1980s. Today, 
with the increasing reach and reducing cost of information transfer, the assumptions 
of three decades ago no longer hold, making fragmented community management 
certainly no longer necessary, and arguably no longer desirable. For government and 
donors, limited to no data has meant billions of dollars of investment have largely been 
under-evaluated in terms of whether the goals of translating infrastructure (means) 
into water services (ends) have been achieved.
Measuring performance by expenditure has now been replaced with the growth of 
spot-checks as illustrated by a dataset of over 400,000 waterpoints visited in Africa in 
the last decade or so (Foster et al., 2019). This represents an incremental step with data 
providing an asset inventory, but gives limited insight to service performance, and is not 
a useful management tool given that the data are out-of-date almost as soon as they 
are published (Thomson, 2012b). In the context of Africa’s data advances in the rapid 
expansion of mobile networks, mobile handsets, and mobile money platforms since 
2007, continuous monitoring through in situ sensors and monitors have been piloted on 
handpumps in rural Africa since 2011 (Thomson et al., 2012a) with trials showing that 
these new data streams can support operational units with simple but effective estimates 
of hourly or daily usage (Nagel et al., 2015; Thomson et al., 2019).
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The value of these data, which must be considered against the additional costs of 
continuous monitoring, are three-fold. First, accountability is enhanced in the perform-
ance and sustainability of infrastructure investments. Accountability works at multiple 
levels in terms of a principal investor (donor, government, NGO) knowing the system 
is working and what level of usage is being achieved against expected performance. In 
addition, data sharing can allow a regulator to monitor performance to determine if  
investments are being made wisely, given competing alternatives. Publicly shared data 
can reduce the prospect of ‘white elephants’ as all stakeholders from tax payers, citi-
zens, and users, to governments and investors can validate that claims are matched by 
results. This need not be universal in monitoring all systems but could sample random 
or sentinel waterpoints including critical public infrastructure, such as schools, clinics, 
and places of worship.
Second, planning can become more transparent. Without information on observed 
demand of waterpoints, it is left to political processes to decide where a new invest-
ment is located. This is an imperfect process at best with evidence that elite capture is 
common. Further, where infrastructure is used heavily there can be a case of upgrading 
to a higher service level. The additional costs may be justifiable based on the demand 
and current financial performance. Improving planning will improve accountability 
and provide a platform for an improved investment case.
Third, reducing information asymmetry lowers or reveals financial risk for existing 
and non-traditional investors. The investment case for rural water has been largely 
met through large public transfers for decades, mainly through overseas development 
assistance. While this is justifiable on several grounds, the results have not attracted 
non-traditional investors, partly due to the vacuum of even the most basic information 
on sector performance, such as a country knowing the number or location of water 
supply infrastructure. The moral case has long outweighed the financial or economic 
case. Africa needs to urgently improve its operational performance and financial case 
for investment. Improving efficiency of current infrastructure and management of ex-
isting funds is the first place to start, rather than a flawed logic of seeking greater budg-
ets to be spent in the same haphazard fashion.
Asset ownership and management arrangements also influence prospects for re-
thinking the investment case. The existing stock of handpumps in Africa is around 
1 million corresponding to about 8 billion US dollars of invested capital. This is a 
vast public transfer which has occurred in a largely uncoordinated manner over several 
decades. UNICEF is one of the main agencies investing and supporting rural water 
services in over 50 countries with an estimated investment in rural water supplies of 
roughly US$1.7 billion between 2006 and 2015, split evenly between humanitarian and 
development assistance (UNICEF, 2018, p. 47). UNICEF is candid in stating that the 
‘monitoring and reporting system is not set up to track the sustainability of achieved 
results’ with a ‘growing body of evidence which is still scattered and of sub-optimal 
quality’ (UNICEF, 2018, p. 141).
In contrast, most government and non-government organizations do not report in-
vestment expenditure or discuss monitoring. The majority of rural waterpoint assets 
are transferred from government to communities in Africa. While it is assumed that 
these assets become community owned, this transfer can be legally questionable, and 
there is evidence that waterpoints can be then privatized by the individual or family on 
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whose land the pump is located, or the waterpoint becomes a club good with a member-
ship group controlling access on membership, financial, or other terms (Koehler et al., 
2015). These terms may be equitable and inclusive, but there is limited information or 
monitoring by government, donors, or other stakeholders to identify and correct ex-
ploitation or exclusion.
In this context, the decision to improve the management and performance of water-
point service rests with local owners. It is therefore a voluntary decision rather than an 
obligation for the local water-users to consider or contract external service providers, 
if  they exist. While community waterpoints can be well managed, there are well-docu-
mented cases of poor financial management where fees are collected but not available 
when needed due to challenges in storing and managing cash prudently and honestly. 
The incentives for local managers to divert a source of regular cash income from their 
community of users to other uses are real. The process of changing ownership from 
community to government is feasible but slow and political, as in the case of experience 
in West Africa (Ndaw, 2015). Contracting procedures could progressively address asset 
ownership and contracting challenges if  government and donors adopted a networked 
and long-term approach to monitoring and managing rural water services at a sensible 
operational scale with exclusive service areas. Information asymmetry reproduces poor 
practice with investment decisions driven to increase infrastructure access rather than 
water service sustainability.
Performance-based, service delivery models have emerged in rural Africa despite 
the unfavourable institutional environment (Narkevic and Kleemier, 2010; McNicholl 
et  al., 2019). West Africa, with a more established culture of private-sector engage-
ment in the water sector, has made more progress than the public-sector approach 
common to much of East and Southern Africa. It is important to note that the private 
sector nests within an institutional framework led by the government and, though far 
from perfect, allows performance to be evaluated and improved over time. Monitoring 
and regulation is also emerging but has been of marginal interest for decades as the 
common conceit is that rural communities are superior in delivery systems than profes-
sional urban utilities which have always required regulation. In part, this is an economic 
logic of delivering water services at least cost in rural areas. Institutions cost money 
and take time to build. Monitoring is not costless and though least-cost approaches 
are being introduced through spot-check monitoring this often targets narrow polit-
ical concerns for perceived value-for-money in donor countries and does not guarantee 
building long-term, local capacity and information systems to be sustainable.
(iv) Financing rural water
Financial sustainability for the rural water sector has long-recognized sharing costs 
between government, donors, and users. What is now labelled as blended finance or 
hybrid finance (Money, 2018) was anticipated in the International Decade of Drinking 
Water Supply and Sanitation in the 1980s (Falkenmark, 1982). The challenge has not 
been to recognize the different forms and share of funding to finance rural water but 
to develop the institutional arrangements to allocate financial and operational risks 
and responsibilities to deliver sustainable services. Community-based management was 
transparent in its early institutional model, with donors and governments funding the 






/oxrep/article/36/1/171/5696680 by guest on 10 M
arch 2021
infrastructure and communities paying for operation and maintenance. Information 
asymmetry largely disguised the unsatisfactory nature of the model which did not pre-
dict the challenges for communities raising and storing local funds for unpredictable 
breakdowns, with limited or absent supply chains for spare parts across often unstand-
ardized waterpoint technologies. Operational efficiencies were consequentially low with 
more funds spent on ‘training’ communities to do better which ignores the limits of the 
model and repeats investment mistakes.
Allocating financial risks and responsibilities more fairly and efficiently requires in-
stitutional and information investments to meet three primary conditions. A first con-
dition is institutional enforcement of a coordinated infrastructure system in terms of 
managing existing investments and planning new interventions at an appropriate polit-
ical or geographic scale. This is a government responsibility which has been distracted by 
donor influence in short-term infrastructure projects rather than institutional strength-
ening and coordination. A second condition is to deliver a satisfactory level of water 
service delivery for which users will pay at least a share of the costs on an ongoing basis 
in a wider network of delivery coordinated by government. Local water-users must 
recognize and know that everyone is being treated equally with a socially acceptable 
approach to recovering costs. A third condition is to implement effective monitoring 
and regulation of service delivery and financial management, including user payments. 
The latter will determine financial options in terms of improving current funding al-
locations to optimize donors meeting priority obligations to reach the most margin-
alized and not cannibalize specific cases where commercial or impact investors may 
crowd-in new funds. For example, this may include larger rural, piped systems serving 
a few thousand rather than a few hundred people. In addition, non-traditional finance 
for performance-based outcomes from private sector supporting SDG delivery or the 
new portfolio of solidarity funds linking water-related consumption in industrialized 
countries with social outcomes in developing regions. Without credible monitoring and 
verification these new funds are not tractable.
A value-based logic would promote improved understanding of financial risks and 
returns. In the absence of information the risk calculus is unknown, potentially misal-
locating low-risk finance to high-return investments. For example, international donors 
with an explicit mandate to reduce poverty may inappropriately allocate funds to sup-
port or underwrite large, rural piped schemes where there may be a case for commer-
cial investment. Concessionary finance would not compete with commercial finance 
to support remote and scattered waterpoints where there is no commercial case for 
investment, but where the social and economic case is compelling and consistent with 
development mandates.
IV. Policy priorities
Three policy priorities emerge from our analysis. First, networking rural services to 
reflect the opportunities of scale, advances in monitoring technologies and data to 
support and guide regulation and policy, and to promote professional service delivery 
providers. This is a daunting challenge in a dynamic environment of donors, NGOs, 
philanthropists, researchers, and more, all trying to ‘do good’ with often large short-term 
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investments and limited future accountability. Governments are often painted as cor-
rupt and inefficient, working with inadequate local budgets leading to dependency on 
external funds and patronage; until and unless government and public action have the 
means to coordinate a more accountable system, the prospects for progress look dim. 
Second, unlocking water payments for consumers requires creating value. Contrary to 
a least-cost model for rural water, more emphasis should be on understanding and re-
sponding to consumer demand, as well as monitoring and eliminating inequalities and 
discriminatory practices. Third, where value is created and services delivered and moni-
tored, performance-based funding models provide one pathway to longer-term, finan-
cial sustainability. None of these three proposals is simple, but each is being advanced 
separately, and in combination they provide a coherent and replicable policy framework 
to progressively achieve sustainable services at scale.
(i) Networking rural water services
Rural water institutions need to develop networked services with inclusive and sustained 
social impacts. A core argument we make is that institutional fragmentation in the de-
sign, funding, and delivery of rural water creates minimal value for rural consumers. 
Recognizing the opportunity of networked services in policy and law is a foundational 
step in seeing rural water as delivering safe water services to people at a relevant polit-
ical scale rather than building infrastructure with uncertain user demand, limited finan-
cial sustainability, and inadequate management. Scale matters in designing an exclusive 
and coherent water supply network that includes community, healthcare, schools, and 
other rural facilities. We have documented emerging evidence that maintenance service 
providers can provide professional services for one million rural water consumers in 
Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Kenya, and Uganda (McNicholl et al., 2019). 
However, any realistic path to sustainability at scale requires overcoming governance 
challenges and creating value for water consumers to unlock payment behaviours.
A lack of institutional accountability is one characteristic of government failure in 
rural water service delivery. Authority ultimately rests with government to ensure ac-
countability, and while this may be absent, weak, or divided, it is a necessary condition 
to determine the rules and liability for accountability. While authority may be easy to 
locate in a central ministry, accountability chains become opaque as multiple ministries 
and levels of government often take part or full responsibility for delivering drinking 
water services. Sub-national government may not be fully accountable to central gov-
ernment, particularly with decentralized authority and responsibility that features 
across much of Africa.
The large and fluctuating constellation of non-government actors from donor agen-
cies, NGOs, foundations, academia, faith-based groups, and private enterprise also in-
fluence accountability pathways. Some of these actors act as de facto government in 
rural areas providing water services. The coordination challenges are daunting as local 
priorities may buffer against external goals, the latter often commanding larger budg-
ets. The political economy of these differing interests often shapes policies and inter-
ventions which may poorly serve rural water users. The ‘anti-development state’ thesis 
(Lockwood, 2006) points to elite capture of resources as investments are allowed to fail 
and the plight of the poor soon attracts another project’s investment and contracting 
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cycle. Without government accountability and commitment, prospects in the future are 
unlikely to be any brighter.
Accountability through greater transparency in information and reporting is now 
increasing, though slowly. Africa’s rapid adoption and application of mobile technolo-
gies has proved how to reduce information asymmetries and financial transaction costs 
through mobile payment systems. Governance structures are less adept but essential 
in harvesting and sustaining these potentially large institutional benefits. Sentinel ex-
emplars to illustrate progress and delivery of universal service delivery at scale will 
be a necessary and politically motivating platform for wider awareness and adop-
tion. The barriers to adoption are real and entrenched, with a decadal time-frame a 
narrow window to redress and transform rural water systems accustomed to failure and 
disappointment.
A more inclusive institutional approach would consider the role of markets and 
the private sector to complement the existing focus on government and communities 
(Koehler et al., 2018). If  an outcome-orientated approach is favoured, market dynamics 
offer a least-cost solution to deliver these goals guided by clear policy and regulation. 
Reallocating risks and responsibilities between institutional actors, particularly redu-
cing the burden on communities, supported by regulation and monitoring, would be a 
major departure from current thinking and practice in much of Africa, notwithstanding 
examples of notable progress in some countries.
Rethinking the institutional landscape suggests there is a credible space for rural 
utilities to act as a regulated monopoly providing networked services. Following the 
argument of  networking multiple waterpoints, a contracted and exclusive service 
provider would offer expertise and economies of  scale in maintaining and manag-
ing a portfolio of  existing and new water supply infrastructure. Government would 
licence a rural utility using performance-based contracts to ensure reliable, safe, and 
accessible services, tailored to the local financial, environmental, and political context. 
Facilities such as schools, hospitals, clinics, and places of  worship may provide the ini-
tial architecture to build out services to benefit neighbouring communities over time. 
This institutional approach is premised on two conditions: (i) water users value and 
pay for improved services, and (ii) performance-based models can attract long-term 
and sustainable funding.
(ii) Unlocking payments by creating value
The political economy and behavioural economics of why rural people pay for water is 
critical in delivering and sustaining networked services. The paradox of water supply 
infrastructure investments in delivering an essential public service but creating limited 
value for consumers based on their payment behaviours is a matter requiring careful 
examination. Dismissing non-payment due to affordability alone is a partial and un-
satisfactory response (Hoque and Hope, 2019). A behavioural approach would focus 
first on the water services people value and will pay for (Hope, 2015; Hope and Ballon, 
2019). This may not neatly align to external policy perspectives and received wisdom, 
but is an essential characteristic of redefining practice to promote more sustainable 
outcomes. The gendered inequalities in rural water services would place a particular 
emphasis on understanding the characteristics of water provision which create value 
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for women and girls (Das, 2017). Within a budget constraint, which aspects of water 
quantity, quality, proximity, and reliability are the priority preferences of consumers, 
particularly women and girls, and how may these be constrained or modified by intra-
household dynamics and power relations?
The replication of urban water tariff  systems in terms of monthly payments does not 
align to rural economies with regard to seasonal peaks of work, income, and rainfall. 
Infrastructure investments which assume a regular, daily consumption over time also 
do not reflect rural practices. Designing services around local demand and value may 
identify alternative models which may create higher value and promote financial sus-
tainability. Non-payment for water services has important implications for affordability 
and water pricing. Do people not pay because they have no service, cannot afford the 
service, or do not value the service? Water-use behaviours are poorly understood and 
relate to the political economy in a household where cooperative conflict may lead to 
gendered inequalities in intra-household decision-making. Women and children dispro-
portionately bear the negative externalities of a lack or failure in a safe, reliable, and 
close water service. Whether the household consensually decides to under-invest in an 
improved water source and internalize potential health or immediate travel costs is a 
matter of uncertainty. Assuming payments are contingent on service delivery, there may 
be an understandable logic why people choose not to pay.
The economic compass of rural water needs to transition from a least-cost approach 
to one of value creation. This requires a political and institutional shift, with govern-
ments taking a more accountable and authoritative role in ensuring investments create 
and sustain value for consumers over time. With information asymmetry everyone can 
hide in the dark by intention or by chance. Value has political salience when aligned to 
user preferences. The payment made by rural consumers for a quantified service level 
provides a compelling and verifiable metric of value.
(iii) Performance-based funds for networked services
Unlocking the payments of the rural poor will support progress in designing perfor-
mance-based funding models. The political discourse in estimating the global funding 
deficit fails to adequately recognize the current poor performance in delivering and 
sustaining water services in rural Africa. With cross-country estimates indicating an 
operational funding gap of up to 90 per cent for rural handpumps (McNicholl et al., 
2019), there is a need for more realism on the nature and scale of the subsidy needed 
to sustain services and develop new management models. A rural water subsidy can 
be performance-based, and progressively reduced, if  governance systems promote net-
worked services that benefit from economies of scale, both in geographic scale and to 
include rural facilities, with a priority on delivering consumer value to increase user 
payments over time.
Government contributions for operational costs will require political acceptance of 
a network services’ approach and a shift from building to also maintaining infrastruc-
ture. Donors and civil society groups will have political influence in supporting, deflect-
ing, or ignoring a coordinated approach in funding networked services. This shift is a 
non-trivial exercise where claiming ownership of a new and tangible intervention, albeit 
short-lived, is easier to communicate to domestic funders and tax payers compared to 
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membership of a less glamorous but collaborative intervention, and likely better value 
for money.
Performance funds will require blending government, consumer, and other funds in an 
accountable and acceptable, long-term financial vehicle. The growing interest in output-
based funds from development partners and social investment funds provides a platform 
for designing funds based on transparent metrics of service performance consistent with 
government policy and priorities. The emergence of Water Services Maintenance Trust 
Funds in Kenya suggests there is private-sector support for performance-based funding 
provided government and rural people contribute and the results are objective and verifi-
able. Performance funds will—and should—hinge on user payments and service delivery 
metrics which are now realistic with in situ sensors and mobile money systems.
Monitoring incurs additional costs which need to create equivalent or greater value. 
A wider conceptualization of the value proposition by financial, economic, and social 
impacts would be achievable with improved data quality. With most waterpoints failing 
within a handful of years from construction, extending the lifespan of infrastructure 
through professional maintenance services for the projected duration would increase 
the financial return on investment. Ancillary benefits would likely accrue in terms of re-
duced collection times, avoidance of water tankers during droughts, attracting higher user 
payments, and avoiding unnecessary capital investments for replacement infrastructure. 
Further, decision-making for rehabilitation, upgrading, or new infrastructure provision 
would be informed by quantifiable data on operational and financial performance. Where 
demand and need were greatest, or water scarcity or water quality risks are higher, plan-
ning and investments could avoid the mistakes of the past and promote a more account-
able and legitimate approach. The challenge and opportunity in the immediate future 
is to demonstrate, validate, and replicate performance-based models at scale which can 
create value to rural people, ensure institutional accountability with local political accept-
ability, and provide sustainable finance for decades rather than years.
V. Conclusion
For policy-makers it would be ill-judged not to worry about water policy in rural Africa 
and to think as the continent is rapidly urbanizing that the rural challenge will there-
fore be more tractable in the future. While trends clearly point to major growth in small 
towns and cities, by 2050 there will be an estimated 909m people living in rural areas, 
a 43 per cent increase compared to 2015 (UNDESA, 2018). Add to this context the 
predictions of climate variability and extremes, where floods and droughts will place 
water supply infrastructure under enormous pressure, and may increase unpredictable 
population movements from water-related stress and conflict, then the rural context 
matters greatly from the point of view of human decency and social cohesion, and, by 
consequence, political expediency. By recognizing that rural water in Africa has specific 
characteristics by scale, institutions, demand, and finance, we argue that rethinking the 
economics of rural water will prioritize policy to (i) network rural services at scale, (ii) 
unlock rural payments by creating value, and (iii) design and test performance-based 
funding models at national and regional scales with an ambition to eliminate the need 
for future, sustainable development goals.
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